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"YOU HAVE TO BE INVOLVED ... TO PLAY
A PART IN IT"
ASSESSING KAINAI ATTITUDES ABOUT VOTING
IN CANADIAN ELECTIONS

YALE D. BELANGER
The question of the right to vote can properly be regarded as an aspect of status and as a determinant
of political influence. The general prohibition of voting privileges denied Indians the possession of
one of the central symbols of membership in the Canadian political system.1
-Harry Hawthorn (1967)

The October 14 election allows the voices of over 800,000 First Nation citizens across Canada to
be heard given the slim margin of victory in over 50 ridings in the last general election. To that end,
the Assembly of First Nations National Chief Phil Fontaine has launched "Vote '08, Change Can't
Wait!", a First Nations political participation and public awareness campaign to encourage voting
among First Nations voters al1d to increase the profile of Aboriginal issues in this election. This initiative is also aimed at soliciting a clear and robust Aboriginal platform from each political party.2
-Assembly of First Nations press release (2008)
1993-97) publicly implored First Nations people
in Canada to participate in the forthcoming
vote. 3 Citing the recent demographic shift
showing a dramatic increase in the number
of young First Nations people nationally and
their potential ability to influence provincial
and federal electoral results, Harper proclaimed
that "Native people have a positive role to play
in this process." Referring to the endemic lack
of voter turnout in recent elections without
offering an explanation for these trends, he
cautioned First Nations readers that simply following politics from the comfort of one's home
was meaningless. Complaining about federal
and provincial political matters was not an

Two days prior to the federal election on
June 28, 2004, the Lethbridge Herald ran an
article in which the renowned Cree leader and
former Member of Parliament Elijah Harper
(Churchill electoral district in Manitoba,
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FIG. 1. NDP MLA (New Demoncratic Party
Member of Legislative Assembly) Elijah Harper sits in
the Manitoba legislature holding an eagle feather for
spiritual strength as he continues to delay the house
debate on the Meech Lake a~cord in Winnipeg, June
19, 1990. Courtesy of The Canadian Press/Wayne
Glowacki.

option, opined Harper, echoing in his concluding comments Michel Foucault's contention
that power is contingent and exercised in spatial (political) contexts. 4 Simply put, "You have
to be involved [as a voter] ... to playa part in
it [Canadian politics).,,5
This study arises in response to Harper's
comments and to provide much-needed context to the limited research examining First
Nations voting behavior. Although it might
seem to be a straightforward question, answering why First Nations individuals resist voting
in Canadian elections can be challenging. As
the above epigraph suggests, Harry Hawthorn
and his colleagues in the 1960s anticipated
First Nations one day participating as voters in
federal and provincial elections, their electoral
participation considered a metric of civic

participation symbolic of the "Indian's" emergent equality. This did not occur as predicted,
even if available statistical data show First
Nations to be exercising their franchise right at
rates higher than during any period since 1960,
the year they were granted the vote. Despite
climbing participation rates, these numbers lag
behind mainstream Canadian society's voter
participation rates, which in recent years have
witnessed a steady decline. That First Nations
eschewed voting in Canadian elections was
by no means an epiphany, however. Since the
1980s and early 1990s several researchers have
described the low First Nations voter turnout
rates as being a significant issue. 6 In the mid1990s, Jonathon Malloy and Graham White
observed, in an understatement, that "natives
do not place a high priority on voting in
Canadian elections."7
In anticipation of a 2004 federal election
call, Elections Canada devoted its entire
November 2003 publication, Electoral Insight,
to First Nations voting behavior in an attempt
to expose the issues hindering First Nations
electoral participation. A major theme to
emerge from the seven essays was the federal
and provincial governments' inability to ensure
First Nations parliamentary and legislative representation, in turn resulting in limited voter
turnout. Similar concerns had been previously
expressed by Trevor Knight, Tim Schouls, Will
Kymlicka, and Roger Gibbins, all of whom
emphasized restructuring federal electoral districts to enhance First Nations parliamentary
participation, echoing the recommendations
of the 1992 Royal Commission on Electoral
Reform and Party Financing and its Committee
for Aboriginal Electoral Reform. 8 The authors
provided compelling reasons for implementing
strategies they suggested could lead to improved
First Nations voter turnout. It was during this
period that several scholars began to stress
the franchise's potential political influence
both federally and provincially and in terms of
fortifying First Nations' political resolve in the
pursuit of self-government.9
The problem, as I see it, was that none of
these works probed the underlying reasons
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leading to poor First Nations voter turnout.

It was not until the publication of Election
Canada's special edition in 2003 that specific
theories were posited for poor First Nations
voting turnout. Unfortunately, the proffered
hypotheses took on a life of their own and were
generally and uncritically accepted by scholars
and public policymakers alike as the key drivers
leading to First Nations voter alienation.l°
A close reading of the available literature,
of which Electoral Insight is the most recent
and arguably the most significant contribution,
suggests six key barriers to First Nations individuals voting in Canadian elections. I propose
that these barriers offer scholars both a general
conceptual framework to study the issues and
an important lens through which to scrutinize
more rigorously regional First Nations voting
trends. This framework is needed to combat
the increasingly prevalent notion that First
Nations voter alienation is a universal phenomenon. Failure to acknowledge the cultural and
regional forces influencing First Nations voting
behavior homogenizes First Nations people and
their unique socioeconomic challenges, suggesting that an encompassing corrective to existing
conditions, once developed, will become a panacea. However, regional and community-based
case studies are desperately needed in order to
survey the dynamics of First Nations voting
behavior rooted in rational choice, and in
order to expand our understanding of why First
Nations resist voting in Canadian elections.
The first barrier is historical, specifically
Canada's failure to grant First Nations the right
to vote. One political scientist has suggested
that lingering memories of Canada using
"enfranchisement as a tool of assimilation" has
led First Nations people to avoid participating in
federal and provincial elections.l1 The second
barrier is socioeconomic status. It is commonly
accepted that First Nations people compose
a disproportionate segment of Canada's poor,
homeless, and transient, all undergirded by low
postsecondary education attainment levels.
This suggests that First Nations impoverishment leads to disenfranchisement. The inability to leave the reserve to vote also leads to

31

disenfranchisement-Elections Canada data
show that 296 polling booths were located in
Canada's estimated 1,100 inhabited reserves
during the 2004 election. The third barrier is
a lack of effective communication. The Royal
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party
Financing, for example, highlighted "inadequate media coverage, insufficient availability
of media, and a failure to provide campaign
materials and issues in Aboriginal languages
as being among the factors that discourage
Aboriginal participation."12 Geographic dispersion is the fourth barrier. As Elections Canada
elaborated, "There are very few electoral districts in which Aboriginal people constitute a
significant enough percentage of the electorate
to wield actual influence in electoral politics."13
The fifth barrier, which is the most popular explanation for the current lack of First
Nations voter participation to date, is "feelings
of exclusion ... a perceived lack of effectiveness, the non-affirmation of group difference
by and within electoral politics, and the
virtual lack of a group's presence in electoral
politics," all of which lead to political disinterest. Accordingly, First Nations individuals
tend "to see themselves as distinct from other
Canadians and as belonging to 'nations
within'; and as nations that are not represented
'within."'14 Two subthemes have emerged from
this discourse. The nationalism discourse suggests that First Nations choose not to vote in
"foreign elections" and to focus their energies
on local reserve politics. The political placement discourse suggests that First Nations
will choose when and where to exercise their
franchise right within the Canadian polity for
maximum political effect.
Finally, the sixth barrier is that the franchise forces "people to surrender their right to
participate in politics by reducing the right to
the merest gesture, the written mark, the vote
... deployed as a tool of totalizing power, which
everywhere defines itself as democratic and
defines democracy by this hollow shell: the vote
that establishes 'representative' government."15
As such, "the vote is an abstraction; it represents the whole political speech and activity
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of individual citizens, from whom other forms
of political speech and activity are no longer
required and, indeed, discouraged."16
Russel Barsh et al. (1997) developed a
comprehensive study to contrast First Nations
and non-Native voting behavior in southern
Alberta from a list of sixteen general elections
and the 1992 Charlottetown constitutional referendum. Many of the hypotheses listed above
were reflected in his conclusions. In particular,
three principal interpretive themes emerged
from the interview data, indicating that (1)
First Nations peoples suffered from feelings of
exclusion from Canadian society that results
in minimal impact in federal and provincial
elections; (2) a lack of practical and strategic
information not only made learning about
candidates difficult but also hampered people
in -their ability to locate polling stations or
electoral lists; and (3) respondents tended to
be less optimistic about influencing federal and
provincial elections but were confident in their
ability to influence band council electionsP
The aforementioned studies constitute the
canon of academic literature exploring why
First Nations people resist participating in
federal and provincial elections. Noticeably
little has changed in the decade since Barsh's
rarely cited study. As a result, our understanding of First Nations participation in Canadian
electoral politics is at best limited. While
government data detailing First Nations voter
participation rates are informative, the issue of
why First Nations people resist voting in federal
and provincial elections is of primary concern.
With these issues in mind, this exploratory
study seeks to help answer the question why
Kainai individuals aged twenty to twenty-nine
resist voting in provincial and federal elections. While building on previous scholarship,
this research is also intended to provide the
additional baseline data needed to develop
more extensive comparative research into First
Nations voting behavior in external and band
council elections in southern Alberta. Is It also
identifies several factors that ultimately hinder
Kainai voting participation in Canadian elections.

COLLECTING DATA ON FIRST NATIONS
PEOPLE

A distinctive feature of this study is that the
results are based upon the views and attitudes
of First Nations people, specifically members of
the Kainai First Nation of southern Alberta.
The intention from the beginning was to gain
a First Nations perspective on the interests,
preferences, and factors that led Kainai individuals to decide on behalf of or against voting
in Canadian elections. The Kainai First Nation
was chosen for several reasons. One, it was
the site of a previous study examining reserve
members' electoral participation, thereby permitting comparative analyses. Second, recent
band elections demonstrated impressive voter
participation rates, trends that appeared to
be at odds with circulating anecdotes suggesting that young Kainai individuals altogether
eschew voting. Finally, all three research assistants (1 male, 2 females) resided at Kainai and
had previous experience working with youths
and elders. Two were selected as interviewers
to foster internal validity and to guide the project's development and implementation, while
the third assisted in developing the literature
review and thematic analysis. Informant participation was limited to English-speaking
reserve residents in an effort to generate a
community-based perspective chronicling why
Kainai individuals generally avoid voting in
off-reserve elections.
Following University of Lethbridge ethics
approval to conduct research with human subjects, the research assistants by word of mouth
snowballed a sample of thirty potential project
participants who were then interviewed to
determine project compatibility (e.g., available
for followup interviews; willing to engage the
interviewers; thought the issue was important,
etc.). A final list of twenty participants was created from the preliminary interview responses.
The age group twenty to twenty-nine was
selected based on overall age characteristics
that showed this group to be one of the largest and fastest growing cohorts amongst the
general reserve population. Individuals in this
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age group also represent the first generation of
students to be taught in community schools
controlled and operated exclusively by First
Nations. Each of the participants {all grade 12
graduates} had been exposed to the same curriculum and in most cases had been taught by
the same teachers.
These individuals were also in the foundational stages of determining, in general, how
they would serve the community politically,
and specifically, how their political choices
could potentially impact their families. The
participants also demonstrated little knowledge of Canadian federal and provincial
politics. Interestingly, most considered voting
an important responsibility even if they did
not precisely understand what it represented
for them, personally. The cohort's collective
employment rates and educational attainment
levels reflected general community standards
based on data available from Statistics Canada.
In all, the cohort of ten men and ten women
was considered statistically representative of
the Kainai First Nations citizenry aged twenty
to twenty-nine.
Subsequent to the selection process, a
follow-up interview was conducted to inform
each participant of their rights and responsibilities, to build trust, and to collect data such
as the participant's age, current home and life
situation, and employment and educational
status, to name a few fields of inquiry. The
personal interview represented the second
stage of the data-gathering phase. For this stage
the research team agreed that the appropriate research model was the person-centered
interview, an exploratory, discussion-based
method designed to "clarify the relations of
individuality, both as output and input, to its
sociocultural context" while eliciting behaviors
and attitudes that suggest "hidden or latent
dimensions of the organization of persons and
of the sociocultural matrix and their interactions."19 This was an appropriate model, as the
participants were comfortable engaging the
research assistant{s} in conversation.
The interviews followed a general format
whereby the researcher engaged the partici-
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pant in a discussion while subtly posing, in no
particular order, a number of predetermined
questions designed to keep the interviewer
attuned to the major themes being investigated
while eliciting the participants' stories. Such
stories, in this instance, provide insight into
personal decision-making. 2o Ferrier has argued
that "knowledge is constructed by people and
groups of people; reality is multiperspectival;
truth is grounded in everyday life and social
relations; life is a text but thinking is an interpretative act; facts and values are inseparable;
and science and all other human activities are
value-Iaden."21 The person-centered interview
enabled the researchers to become further
grounded in the context of social interface
that led to the development of both culturally {Kainai} and regionally {reserve} specific
meanings for voting. 22
For the research's final phase a thematic
analysis was produced to draw themes central
to Kainai voting behavior through "careful
reading and re-reading of the data."23 In each
section the voices of the participants are utilized to allow those individuals to "tell the
story," as it were, of the issues and concerns
influencing their voting behavior. The coding
process involved identifying an important
comment or interview moment prior to proceeding with data interpretation. 24 Encoding
enabled the organization and categorization of
data from which central themes were identified
and developed. 2s Data collection and analysis
proceeded simultaneously, and transcripts
were r~read to ensure accuracy and thematic
applicability to the original data. To express
our appreciation for the time provided and
to honor the knowledge made available to
us, each participant was provided with a fiftydollar honorarium.
THE POLITICAL SETTING

Located in southern Alberta, the Kainai
First Nation is situated on the Blood Reserve.
At 881 square kilometers, it is Canada's largest geographic reserve, boasting a population
in excess of 10,000. A member nation of the
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BLOOD INDIAN RESERVE
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MOUN'TA1N RANGE

FIG. 2. Map representing historical and actual
boundaries of the Blood Indian' Reserve in southern
Alberta, 1999. Created for Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada (INAC), Negotiations Group, Specific
Claims. Courtesy of Public Works and Government
Services Canada (PWGSC) for Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada (INAC). [http://geoportail-geoportal.
ainc-inac.gc.ca/mp-prd/lnd-03_e.htmll

Blackfoot Confederacy, the Kainai originally
organized into small bands typically no larger
than thirty people. 26 Prior to their mideighteenth-century acquisition of the horse,
the Kainai traversed their territory on foot, a
period of limited mobility known as the "dog
days," which was followed by the development
of more efficient hunting techniques and the
expansion of Kainai territorial claims.27 Soon
the Kainai were positioned as a preeminent
military power in the northwestern region of
the Plains. 28 Kainai political processes stressed
that individuals maintain close relationships
in the community. Many political scientists
present tribal societies like the Kainai as demonstrating "little or no specialized structure of
government" and that with the appearance of

non-Natives, "indigenous cultures were largely
exterminated or pushed aside."29 Countering
this position is a growing literature base demonstrating political complexity among North
American indigenous cultures, even if the
Kainai's political and social experiences did not
permit their leaders to "conceive of authority
in European-western terms" prior to European
contact. 30 Defined communally, all functions
of Kainai tribal government were ruled over by
the collective. Here, self-interest could not be
separated from tribal good-they were inextricably intertwined and virtually identicaPl To
achieve rank, one needed to gain community
respect through reputation building based
upon acts of bravery, for wisdom and discretion,
by becoming an object of admiration, in sum
by interacting closely, positively and often with
neighbors and family.
Following extended contact the Kainai
pressured the British Crown for a treaty, a
nation-to-nation pact establishing the rules
needed to guide both Indian-Crown relations
and territory-sharing provisions. 32 Specifically,
the depletion of the buffalo significantly challenged the Kainai's regional political and military supremacy, leading to treaty negotiations
in September 1877. In return for annuities
and the Crown's promise to protect the last
remaining buffalo herds and create sheltered
reserves, the Kainai and Treaty 7 signatories
ceded 54,000 square kilometers of modern-day
southern Alberta to facilitate settler migration.
Unbeknownst to Kainai leaders anticipating that previous treaty assurances regarding
their continued right to self-govern would be
honored, the Crown strictly adhered to an
assimilation policy envisioning Indian absorption into Canadian society. Legislation such
as the Indian Act (1876) was established to
assist implementing assimilation;33 residential
schools were created to instruct First Nations
children in Canadian cultural norms;34 and
reserves established to segregate First Nations
from Canadian society's ills all the while
simultaneously promoting their incorporation
into that society.35 In particular, the Indian
Act provided for the administration of three
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key areas: allocation of reserve lands, defining Indian status, and granting powers of
enforcement to the Canadian government.
Provisions within the Indian Act forced an
end to traditional governance and replaced it
with municipal-style models overseen by local
Indian agents empowered to enforce provisions
outlawing traditional and hereditary leadership
selection processes.
The most debilitating challenge to sustaining traditional Kainai governance came in
the form of the Department of Indian Affairs
(DIA), established in 1880, the country's central bureaucracy responsible for the day-to-day
activities and political processes of reserve
communities. The superintendent general of
the DIA, determined to enforce the imposition
of the elective band council model (est. 1871),
consequently deprived traditional leaders of
political recognition by acknowledging only
those individuals elected according to the
Indian Act criteria. The goal was to transform
hereditary leadership models into more palatable municipal-style councils "intended to serve
as a pliable instrument that would advance the
general aims of federal tutelage and support
the particular day-to-day objectives of field
officers."36 Presented as a voluntary process,
few bands adopted this foreign electoral model,
maintaining allegiance to traditional leadership selection procedures. Those who chose the
electoral model nevertheless found Canadian
officials disinclined to personally interact with
their leadership. From a federal perspective, the
most direct means available to oppose federal
plans was to participate in council meetings
and by voting for the candidate believed best
suited to deal with federal officials.
First Nations resistance compelled federal
officials to implement the Indian Advancement
Act (1884) that aggressively championed
Indian assimilation by once again conferring certain privileges to bands considered
adequately advancing to a more civilized status.
The Advancement Act promoted training
local leaders for municipal responsibilities and
providing those responsible for guiding the
elected band council with the authority to
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levy taxes. The council was further empowered to manage policing and public health
matters. Most reserves refused to comply and
the Canadian government again responded.
In 1895 the Indian Act was amended, providing Indian agents and DIA officials with the
sweeping authority needed to oust traditional
leaders who had been elected to band council
but who had since been deemed unfit for political office by the Indian agent. Once ousted
from power, these individuals were considered
ineligible by law to run in future elections or
hold band council positions.
Despite what could be considered a questionable federal policy and legislative orientation, the Kainai demonstrated a willingness
to engage with and participate in Canadian
society. As part of its Treaty 7 obligations to
the Crown, the Kainai permitted unfettered
access to their traditional lands, thereby
fulfilling a promise to open their territory to
settlers wishing to share the country with its
original inhabitants. 37 Following the buffalo
hunting economy's failure in 1879, the Kainai
quickly and successfully adopted farming and
ranching. As part of the regional southern
Alberta agrarian economy, reserve farming and
ranching flourished into the early 1920s, their
ultimate failure tied to bureaucratic ineptitude
and malevolence. 38 Striking volunteer ism in
the Great War (1914-18) and World War II
(1939-45) occurred. Confirming the Kainai's
willingness to assist mainstream Canadian
society was the leadership's decision to grant
military access to the Blood Reserve in 1941,
thereby permitting the Canadian Forces to
establish a 50,000-acre bombing and gunnery
range that took up approximately one-seventh
of the reserve land base. 39 In 1956 the community once again chose to negotiate in good
faith with Canadian officials, granting access
to 1,550 acres of reserve land that enabled the
successful expansion of the St. Mary's River
Irrigation District and the flow of much-needed
water to southern Alberta's drought-stricken
farmers and ranchers. 4o
This participation, however, did not extend
to voting in Canadian elections, despite John
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G. Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives
granting Indians the franchise in 1960. Indians
were previously barred from voting due to a
perceived lack of civilized status, privileges
such as treaty rights inaccessible to mainstream
Canadians, a lack of fee simple landholdings,
and sovereign assertions not befitting Canadian
citizens.41 Diefenbaker ensured people that the
Indian vote in federal and provincial elections
would not compromise their status or make
this participation contingent on "complete
assimilation into Canadian society.''42 Despite
these assurances, Barsh et al. concluded that
voter participation among the Blood (Kainai)
and Peigan (Piikuni) of southern Alberta was
limited, albeit higher in federal than provincial elections. However, the number of people
voting dropped consistently over a fifteenyear period beginning in 1980 that has yet to
recover at the Kainai First Nation. 43 Outside
Barsh's work, little in the way of reliable statistical data articulating southern Alberta First
Nations voter participatiQn rates and voting
trends exists for the 1960s, '70s, and '80s.
National research conducted by Elections
Canada showed First Nations voter participation rates in the 2000 federal election ranged
from 35.3 percent in Quebec to 66.9 percent
in Prince Edward Island, with Alberta listed
at 53.9 percent.44 The lack of specific data and
their reliability can be attributed to what one
academic described as the "virtual absence
of electoral districts where Aboriginal people
represent the majority of voters.''45 A similar
study found First Nations turnout for the
Charlottetown referendum in 1992 was 41 percent, with 38 percent and 40 percent participating in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections,
respectively. Mainstream voter participation
rates of 71.8 percent for the referendum and
69.9 percent and 67 percent for the two elections suggest that the majority of First Nations
tend to avoid voting in Canadian elections.46
In their research examining status and
nonstatus Indian voter turnout for federal, provincial, and band elections in New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island between
1962 and 1993, David Bedford and the late

Sidney Pobihushchy discovered substantial
voter participation in band council elections
in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia between
1972 and 1992 and notably lower participation
in federal elections in both provinces during
the same time period. Their work revealed First
Nations voter participation in New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia band coulIcil elections (197292) hovered in the 90 percent range while participation in federal elections in both provinces
ranged from 17.8 and 54 percent, respectively,
to 27.6 and 45.2 percent, respectively, for provincial elections.47 Bedford later showed New
Brunswick First Nations people engaging as
voters, with 70 percent participating in the
1962 federal election. 48 Nevertheless, that
number had dropped to 17.7 percent by 1988,
with corresponding trends for provincial elections. Finally, he also found Nova Scotia First
Nations participation in both provincial and
federal elections to remain fairly consistent
during the same study period.
Notwithstanding the right to vote, which
provides an avenue enabling an individual's
civic participation and political influence,
First Nations voter participation rates lag. The
question as to why this persists is significant,
especially in light of three key points. One, the
move toward securing treaty rights continues
to be undermined by the federal government's
limited interpretation of these rights, which
arguably limits First Nations political capacity.
Two, the disputed Aboriginal self-government
process currently proceeds at a snail's pace, with
no real end or specific goals in sight, thereby
challenging First Nations desires to engage the
Canadian government in a nation-to-nation
relationship.49 Third, current demographic
trends highlight the fact that First Nations
will comprise an ever-increasing segment of
the Canadian population, suggesting that if
effectively utilized the vote could be employed
in key regions to ensure First Nations political
representation and parliamentary influence.50
The Kainai voter survey offers insight as to why
the vote is viewed with suspicion despite its
publicized potential to improve First Nations
political participation in Canadian society.

ASSESSING KAINAI ATTITUDES ABOUT VOTING IN CANADIAN ELECTIONS
THE KAINAI FIRST NATIONS VOTER SURVEY

Interviewing for this project took place
starting in November 2005 prior to the Kainai
Band Council election. To provide context, 51
percent of eligible voters in the Kainai First
Nation participated in selecting a chief and
twelve councillors from a potential field of 115
candidates (one out of every 100 citizens on
reserve ran for council). Albeit 4 percent lower
than the 2001 elections, band election voter
participation far outstripped the 13 percent
Kainai First Nation turnout rate in the 2004
federal election and the estimated one-quarter
participation in the provincial election. 51
This survey interviewed people at length to
determine the thought process leading to their
decision to vote or not to vote and to assess the
six conceptual barriers to First Nations voting
participation previously outlined. As discussed
below, the participants at times both validated
and contradicted the barriers to voting outlined above while presenting four additional
themes/hypothesis detailed below that improve
our collective understanding of why Kainai
individuals resist voting in Canadian elections.
THE PERSONAL ASPECT OF POLITICS

The Kainai historically embraced a political model characterized by an absence of
power relations {coercive, hierarchical, and
authoritative).52 Maintaining relationships
was stressed and aggressive political competition among individuals avoided. Folks were
taught to govern their own personal affairs
in communities where no individual had the
right to govern another. Leadership skills were
seen as gifts derived from the Creator and
fostered in communities where responsibilities
to the community were stressed rather than
becoming "a claimant of rights.,,53 A complex
network of relationships evolved that guided
all functions of government conducted by the
people who were responsible for the day-to-day
governance. 54 Importantly, those considered to
be commanding or overbearing were rejected,
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making it possible for leaders to achieve rank
only by gaining respect through reputationbuilding based upon acts of bravery, wisdom,
and discretion, in essence by becoming an
object of admiration. 55 This check was devised
to avoid power becoming concentrated in one
or a handful of individuals. In sum, individuals
demonstrating knowledge and experience were
viewed as leaders in communities where lobbying for leadership positions through structured
voting procedures was shunned.
The loss of this previously intimate and personal political process was identified as problematic by all project respondents, in particular
the lack of personal interaction with political
candidates. All suggested that such behavior
reflected a lack of interest in First Nations
affairs at best, and at worst the belief that
politicians held disdain for First Nations people
and their concerns. Leadership selection was
presented as an important responsibility not
to be taken lightly. One twenty-eight-yearold male concluded, "I see the significance of
voting in both [federal and provincial elections] because, you know, I'm getting older and
a lot of stuff is going to be affecting me now. It
affects everyday life and the people that do get
elected in, you know, you've got to know what
they stand for."56 Federal and provincial candidates' refusal to visit the reserve to speak to one
individual about the issues or to engage him
as a political equal kept this individual from
voting in Canadian elections.57 It also forced
one twenty-six-year-old male to reference the
print media and television for his information. Television in particular was cited by most
informants (n = 16) as an essential political
tool needed to forge a general sense of personal
interface with politicians. This was required, as
the latter informant suggested, before a voter
can "really see and understand politicians."
Television was considered the best medium
available for participants to scrutinize political
candidates and to read their body language,
which was considered central in assisting
individuals in making an informed decision.
Elaborating on this point, a twenty-something
female stated "I guess if I see the person and
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. . . go hear them talking . . . and if I think
they are sincere" simply by watching how they
handle themselves in public makes easier the
task of selecting a candidate. Interestingly, and
reflecting the majority of respondents (n = 15),
she assumed that politicians "wouldn't lie."58
This is not surprising, for historically lying
or misrepresenting oneself or your family in a
small First Nations community would quickly
be discovered and the individual shamed.
Regaining the trust of neighbors was an onerous task. Maintaining community balance
was the key; hence, lying was objectionable
and something that political leaders did not
practice.59 Although a handful of respondents
(n = 6) were concerned that certain politicians
had been exposed as lying to their constituents,
the majority overwhelmingly believed that
politicians dealt truthfully with the media.
One twenty-eight-year-old male concluded
that politicians are like an open book-if they
are lying and "you really want to know about
them" you can simply "go online and ... just
research it." Personally knowing a politician
made candidate selection easier, for according
to one twenty-two-year-old female, this would
allow you to become more familiar with "what
kind of job they do, what kind of person they
are, what kind of experience they have." She
concluded, "If I know their experiences ...
that is how I would pick them.,,60 Each individual emphasized the need for interaction
with candidates to find out the truth. This, all
suggested, could be done by attending political forums and posing tough political questions to the candidates. At that point, adds a
twenty-six-year-old male, "you can tell a guy is
lying."61
Personal interface with political candidates
was also considered an important educational
tool, one that most participants (n = 15)
claimed would help them surmount a lack of
education about the Canadian political system.
This was considered the most effective means
available to potential voters seeking a quick
education about the issues. 62 In communities
that still embrace storytelling to convey social
norms and mores, this response should not

be surprising. What are difficult to overcome
are the feelings of intimidation associated
with voting, which is further exacerbated by
a limited knowledge of Canadian federal and
provincial politics. This often dissuaded people
from exercising the franchise, according to
a twenty-seven-year-old male: "I just think
that people ... are scared to [get involved].
They don't know what they are like, [they
lack] influence." He concluded, "I think just
a lot more Natives should be voting and getting into politics.,,63 One twenty-one-year-old
male suggested that some people "don't have
enough knowledge on who to vote for, who is
who, and they kind of don't really understand.
It is kind of hard for them to vote for anybody;
what if they vote for the wrong person?"64 A
twenty-nine-year-old female indicated that the
complexity of federal and provincial Indian
policies is difficult to discern and that further
education would make the act of voting "more
meaningful.,,65
A minority (n = 7) of the respondents
indicated that feelings of political and cultural
disassociation resulted, causing one twenty-sixyear-old female to conclude, "I just really don't
see the relevance of all that, because ... I don't
really feel connected," while adding that the
lack of communication and personal education
makes voting "just a big headache."66 Similarly,
a twenty-six-year-old male, referring to the
Canadian political system, concluded, "I don't
understand it and it doesn't really involve me
and my family, my kids. It wouldn't be right for
me to vote, because I don't understand. I'm not
gonna waste any body else's time."
DISCERNING GOSSIP FROM FACT

The Committee for Aboriginal Electoral
Reform concluded in 1991 that First Nations
lacked the information needed to exercise
rational choice, thereby implicitly barring
them from effectively participating as voters.
However, the recent proliferation of television,
radio, and especially the Internet means that
folks at the Blood Reserve are impressively
connected to nonreserve media sources. 67 The
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issue is not so much whether people are connected, which they are, but rather how people
utilize this information to best determine suitable candidates. In this instance two avenues
of research were regularly pursued to assist
respondents to become more informed about
the issues: (1) discussion with family members
and friends and (2) employing the media as a
reliable agent of fact. Participants employed
the two methods in a mutually supporting
fashion to acquire knowledge they believed
would allow them to make an educated decision about provincial and federal candidates.
Word of mouth was most often utilized, given
the variety of available media on reserve that
frequently offered contradictory commentary.
This often-confusing punditry led to increased
personal interface with neighbors and relatives
that most often took the form of informal faceto-face discussions and e-mail and Internet
chat-room debates. Nevertheless, the media,
including local and national print media, radio,
and television, are considered reliable agents of
fact.
When asked how she knew the information
she obtained about a particular candidate was
accurate a twenty-four-year-old female replied,
if the "person said it to a national newspaper
... and they have the nerve to publish it ...
obviously it's true." Lethbridge residents rely
upon media information to help them in the
decision-making process in much the same way
project participants suggested existing media
outlets assist their voting choices. Many informants (n = 6) regularly access the Lethbridge
Herald, the Globe and Mail, and the National
Post either online or by purchasing the paper
during elections. Many more (n = 13) watched
the local and national television newscasts or
tuned into the local radio station (CFWE 89.9
FM) for news updates. The majority (n = 13),
including a twenty-four-year-old male, indicated that the mass media assisted them in the
decision-making process. He stated, "It kind of
makes you think about which party you want
to vote for. They state their thing ... they are
telling you what they are going to do, what
they are planning, how they are going to try to
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campaign to win the votes. It gives you a good
idea of who you want to vote for." An interesting tension exists concerning the participants'
outright acceptance of media interpretations
as truthful statements. For instance, a twentyeight-year-old male stated that in addition to
word of mouth, the Internet is his main source
of information: "I try to talk to a lot of people;
you try not to take everything as truth. You
just have to research for yourself. You trust
your friendships as well." With the Internet he
was able to read relevant articles and forward
them to his friends if he believed the writings
"important enough."
Perhaps most telling was the study participants' methodology for separating fact from
gossip. While seeking out advice from family
members was cited as an important educational
tool, a twenty-four-year-old female indicated
that she was unable to determine how her
family members separated gossip from fact.
Despite being inundated with negative campaigning, one informant refused to accept the
impossibility of positive outcomes. Alluding to
the import of remaining personally connected
to political candidates, a twenty-seven-year-old
male suggested that differentiating gossip from
fact is possible if you take the time to listen to
others. A limited majority (n = 12) claimed
that this was in fact a difficult proposition,
made all the more challenging when you consider that "there is always truth behind some
things because why would they be talking
about it if it's not there? You know that there
is something going on but you don't know what
it is.".68 Added a twenty-four-year-old female,
"Sometimes I think it's just pretty much
all gossip," elaborating that word-of-mouth
information does not help her in her decisionmaking process because "a lot of times you will
hear someone say something to somebody and
then sometimes you will hear something else
and the story's totally changed."
Notwithstanding the importance placed
on engaging neighbours and relatives, Kainai
society was and remains a highly individualistic environment where individuals are encouraged to formulate decisions upon acquiring
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the requisite information. This helps those
who have difficulty discerning gossip from
fact. For instance, a twenty-two-year-old male
suggested that "everyone has their own opinion" and that he "can't really decide" what is
gossip. He did admit though that referencing
numerous information sites assisted him in
his decision-making process. 69 Stressing the
need to establish interactive relationships with
political candidates, a twenty-eight-year-old
male suggested that separating gossip from
fact would be easier if federal and provincial
politicians visited the reserve in order to speak
with community members, "because it's not
like they are at your fingertips, you can't really
go to a person and say, 'What do you believe'?"
He explained that by accepting word-of-mouth
information uncritically is "kind of like feeding
the monster." He added that "you hear it all the
time. The parents say this guy did that, and this
guy did this. You hear it all the time." However,
a female informant indicated that she tried
to separate herself from that process "because
they say bad things about 'people [and] I kind
of wonder what their motivation is. Is it to do
something for themselves or to do something
good for the community?"70 Yet she wondered
whether this benefited her candidate selection
process. "I look at the kinds of jobs they have
and what their status is in the community and
how they are actively involved," which "makes
it easier for me. As long as they're educated and
you know they are not just doing it for themselves, but for the community." In sum, there
exists no bona fide mechanism beyond word
of mouth that permits people to discern gossip
from accurate assertions of fact.
KAINAI POLITICS TAKE PRECEDENCE

Four distinctive political groups comprised
the Blackfoot Confederacy: the South Piikuni,
the North Piikuni, the Siksika, and the Kainai.
Historically, these four nations would meet
annually for the Sun Dance, where ceremonies were performed and family and political
ties renewed. Political and economic councils
were held where leaders of the four nations

debated regional matters and formulated resolutions. Whereas larger confederacy concerns
dominated the debates, Kainai issues were also
discussed, as local leaders never lost sight of the
importance of resolving their concernsJI After
the celebration the smaller Kainai bands would
disperse to their traditional territories and for
the rest of the year would self-govern. The
political model was interactive and allowed for
Kainai issues to take precedence as opposed to
deferring to the larger confederacy structureJ2
That being said, the Kainai have always demonstrated a proclivity for focusing on internal
matters to the detriment of maintaining external alliancesP
Not surprisingly, the participants who were
most critical of the federal and provincial
governments demonstrated less inclination
to vote. These individuals stated that reserve
politics were their primary concerns, with all
outside political issues remaining peripheral.
A twenty-four-year-old male indicated that
he had "never known too many people to
vote in a Federal election" because they were
"more concerned about their own reserve,"
where life is lived and local decisions are felt
and experienced. In his opinion, limited community participation in provincial elections
resulted. He further hypothesized that reserve
residents would "rather get things straightened
out on their own reserve before they move to
other things." Supporting this conclusion was
a twenty-one-year-old male who stated "with
the Native people, we are more focused on our
needs, on our reserves for our people, than out
in the world . . . off the reserve." A twentysix-year-old female commented, "I think it's
because I live on the reserve, but everything
that has to be done out there [affects] me
directly because I'm living in a house that
needs this done ... and I'm driving on the
roads that need this done."
Reserve residents were inherently more
aware of the community's political issues,
and voting in reserve elections was thus presented as less imposing than participating in
larger Canadian elections due to an improved
understanding of the key political issues. It was
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also presented as each community member's
responsibility. This did not militate against
becoming educated about and participating in
Canadian elections. A twenty-three-year-old
woman, for instance, concluded that while she
was "more aware of voting on the reserve than
what was going on" provincially and federally,
additional education about the issues "being
brought up regarding Natives" was needed.
In return, "Natives should vote more so their
voice could be heard."74
Even so, "Our politics are the reserve," one
twenty-eight-year-old male concluded, adding
that "no one looks outside the reserve because
their help is to mainly focus on our reserve."
The interviewers, however, sensed that most of
the participants were contemplating becoming
more informed about and eventually involved
in federal and provincial politics. Participating
in band elections was considered by several
(n = 6) to be a gateway to this anticipated participation. Previous experience voting in band
elections also provided a handful of others
(n = 4) with a sense that one person can impact
the outcome of an election. As confirmed by a
twenty-four-year-old female, any person "could
have a deciding vote." The concern of most
participants was summed up by a twenty-eightyear-old male: "We don't know what is going
on, on the outside [of the reserve]." Another
lamented that his family and friends may
choose to vote in Canadian elections due to
the fact that "people are just growing conscious
of the situation that Natives are restricted to,"
and that casting a ballot was but one of a limited number of options available to reserve residents seeking to foster positive socioeconomic
change.15 If indeed the vote is seen as a last-ditch
effort to improve reserve conditions, this will
demand that voters improve their knowledge
of political candidates, since these candidates
"have our interests [integrated into] their political platform, [and] those are the type of people
that I want to vote for."76 According to one
respondent, this is the means to secure political
voice for First Nations people in Canada: "It's
our responsibility to do that."77 A twenty-fouryear-old female proposed establishing a regional,
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southern Alberta First Nations party "that has
just as much influence as even if it was just the
basic Native population. We could have people
over there that protect our rights."
Clearly, reserve politics take precedence
over other political issues, although it was once
again suggested that sending federal and provincial political representatives to the reserve
for educational purposes would likely lead to
increased voter participation. Two points are
highlighted here. First, project participants
wanted outside political candidates to become
aware of local political issues. Second, the
complexity of the Canadian political process
was again highlighted; specifically the local
(some might say myopic) focus on reserve politics is often to the detriment of understanding
regional and national political issues and how
they may impact the community. A twenty-sixyear-old male indicated that he would be more
willing to vote if he was able to learn about
Canadian politics while simultaneously teaching political candidates about important reserve
issues. One twenty-nine-year-old female went
so far as to suggest that she would be willing to
seriously consider voting for any party willing
to visit the reserve to see firsthand how federal
and, to a lesser extent, provincial policy decisions directly impact First Nations people. She
added that while it would be overly optimistic
to suggest that conditions would straightaway
improve, it would nevertheless provide political
candidates with a showcase of current living
conditions to impress upon them that their
efforts in improving their understanding of First
Nations people would be rewarded. A twentysix-year-old male agreed, adding that should
politicians visit reserve communities, they could
see firsthand what was "happening, and then
they could really truly see what the living
conditions are, and how the Indians live on
the reserve, and see the areas that we actually
need help on." Only when they see the "living
situations for some people" will federal and
provincial politicians and political candidates
understand "why some people don't really care
about them" and their specific federal and provincial political concerns.18
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CANADIANS' PERCEPTIONS OF KAINAI
FIRST NATION'S NEEDS

The period following the signing of Treaty
7 in September 1877 is characterized by the
Kainai as one of hunger and broken promises,
exacerbated by government attitudes equating
the Blackfoot as little more than obstacles to
western expansion.79 Following confederation
in 1867, the new federal government embarked
on an aggressive social program aimed at
assimilating the original inhabitants of the
land. BO This period still resonates with Kainai
community members, as confirmed by a recent
study examining historic and contemporary
Blackfoot participation in the Canadian
Forces. One informant, disturbed by what he
considered to be "the Canadian government's
poor treatment of returning veterans," which
inCluded restrictions on voting in Canadian
elections, thought that he and his communities were issues of peripheral concern to mainstream society. In his words, they were simply
"brushed aside."Bl
Several participants (n = 17) still harbor
resentment toward the Canadian government
and are concerned that they have little access
to the circuits of power. Yet, interestingly
enough, many indicated (n = 14) that participating in Canadian politics would lead to a
sense of empowerment, thereby providing them
with the ability to derail anti-First Nations policies prior to implementation. This unique take
on events embraced various strategies such as
not voting for a specific party. The latter-day
Progressive Conservatives and the modern-day
Conservative Party were most often mentioned
in this context, leading one twenty-eight-yearold male to conclude, "It is pretty well known
that they don't want treaties any more and they
have just said things." Party affiliations aside,
a twenty-three-year-old female acknowledged
the Canadian state's overarching role in First
Nations politics, adding that it was incumbent
upon all reserve residents to vote in federal and
provincial elections in order to shape incoming governments and mitigate the "impact they
have on us here ... on the reserve." A twenty-

seven-year-old male claimed he needed to vote
because failure to do so could result in his
people's "rights being taken away." Similarly,
a twenty-two-year-old female admitted that
she would be willing to participate and vote
because voting "the wrong guy in there" could
result in the government taking "away our
[treaty] rights."
Those who desire voting privileges often
find themselves unable to exercise this right
on the reserve. Many, such as one twenty-sixyear-old male, believe that there is no access
to voting in federal and provincial elections
on the reserve, whereas a twenty-eight-year-old
male stated that traveling to reserve voting
booths is an onerous task due to the geographic
disparity of the electorate (the Blood Reserve
is 881 square kilometers), poor roads, and the
lack of reliable transportation. According
to Elections Canada, "If a polling station is
entirely comprised of a reserve or is mostly
comprised of a reserve, returning officers are
instructed to establish polling stations on the
reserve, wherever the band council will allow
it. In such cases, the polling station is located
at the band council office or community
centre." In those instances where the band
council declines, "the polling station is set up
as close as possible to the outside boundary
of the reserve. Aboriginal electors living off
reserve vote at a regular polling station in the
polling division in which they live."B2
Recent news reports suggested that no polling booths would be situated at the Kainai
First Nation or the neighboring Piikuni First
Nation for the 2008 provincial election, which
generated negative publicity about a practice
condemned by municipal and provincial politicians alike. B3 A twenty-eight-year-old male
was critical, questioning why more polling
booths were not located on the reserve. He also
expressed concern that an individual living
in neighboring Cardston, for example, could
potentially be voted into power without the
reserve residents' best interests at heart. He
added cryptically that a First Nations political
candidate meeting with electoral success would
likewise be forced to represent Cardston interests,
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TABLE 1
FIRST NATIONS, INUIT, AND METIS SENATORS
Name

Political Af:6.lation

Province/Territory

Date Appointed Native Origin
[yyyy.mm.ddl

Hardisty, Richard Charles

Conservative

Northwest Territories

1888.02.23

Boucher, William Albert

Liberal Party of Canada

Saskatchewan

1957.01.03

Metis

Glastone, James

Independent Conservative

Alberta

1958.01.31

First Nations

Metis

Williams, Guy R.

Liberal Party of Canada

British Columbia

1971.12.09

First Nations

Adams, Willie

Liberal Party of Canada

Northwest Territories

1977.04.05

Inuit

Watt, Charlie

Liberal Party of Canada

Quebec

1984.01.16

Inuit

Marchand, Leonard Stephen

Liberal Party of Canada

British Columbia

1984.06.29

First Nations

Twinn, Walter Patrick

Progressive Conservative Party

Alberta

1990-09.27

First Nations

St. Germain, Gerry

Progressive Conservative Party

British Columbia

1993.06.23

Metis

Chalifoux, Thelma J.

Liberal Party of Canada

Alberta

1997.11.26

Metis

Gill, Aurelien

Liberal Party of Canada

Quebec

1998.09.17

First Nations

Sibbeston, Nick G.

Liberal Party of Canada

Northwest Territories

1999.09.02

First Nations

Dyck, Lillian Eva

New Democratic Party

Saskatchewan

2005.03.24

First Nations

Lovelace Nicholas, Sandra M.

Liberal Party of Canada

New Brunswick

2005.09.21

First Nations

a group of individuals he framed as having
demonstrated disinterest for and antipathy
toward the Kainai.
The overwhelming feeling that reserve residents' needs were being ignored led a number
of participants (n = 11) to conclude that First
Nations parliamentary representation is lacking (see Tables 1 and 2). A twenty-two-year-old
female echoed these sentiments by suggesting
that becoming personaliy associated "with a
lot of the candidates" would make her "more
inclined to try and vote if I knew they represent our interests." Another was more negative,
characterizing politicians as uncaring due to
their refusal to visit the reserve. A twentyeight-year-old male countered this commentary, suggesting that even though he lacked
an in-depth understanding of the Canadian
political process, he was convinced that most
federal and provincial politicians were proFirst Nations and interested in addressing the
issues of most concern to First Nations. With
this in mind, he suggested that he would be
more interested in Canadian politics "if you

throw in a political party just for Natives."
Supporting this view was a twenty-three-yearold female who indicated her willingness to
actively participate in federal and provincial
politics if there were more First Nations political candidates.84 This is needed, according to
the majority of participants (n = 17), for unless
First Nations individuals are situated in the key
political chambers where First Nations policies
are crafted and implemented, the potential
exists for all historic rights to be extinguished,
suggesting further that "more representation
for the Native people that ran in these elections" would make voting an easier chore.85
THE FUTURE OF FIRST NATIONS VOTING

Seven of the study's twenty participants previously voted in a federal or provincial election,
or both. Two of the twelve who did not were
too young to participate in previous elections
but indicated their desire to do so. The remaining eleven participants provided various reasons for not voting which are categorized and
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TABLE 2
FIRST NATIONS, INUIT, AND METIS MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
Name

Political Affilation

Constituency

Date Elected

Native Origin

[yyyy.mm.ddl

McKay, Angus

Conservative

Marquette, Manitoba

1871.03.02

Metis

Delorme, Pierre

Conservative

Provencher, Manitoba

1871.03.03

Metis

Riel, Louis

Independent

Provencher, Manitoba

1873.10.13

Metis

Boucher, William Albert

Liberal Party of Canada

Rosthern, Saskatchewan

1948.10.25

Metis

Rheaume, Eugene (Gene)

Progressive Conservative Party Northwest Territories

1963.04.08

Metis

Marchand, Leonard Stephen

Liberal Party of Canada

Kamloops-Cariboo,
British Columbia

1968.06.25

Metis

Firth, Walter (Wally)

New Democratic Party

Northwest Territories

1972.10.30

Metis

Ittinuar, Peter

New Democratic Party

Nunatsiaq,
Northwest Territories

1979.05.22

Metis

Keeper, Cyril

New Democratic Party

Winnipeg-St. James,
Manitoba

1980.02.18

Metis

St. Germain, Gerry

Progressive Conservative Party Mission-Port Moody,
British Columbia

1983.08.29

Metis

Suluk, Thomas

Progressive Conservative Party Nunatsiaq,
Northwest Territories

1984.09.04

Inuit

Anawak, Jack Iyerak

Liberal Party of Canada

Nunatsiaq,
Northwest Territories

1988.11.21

Inuit

Blondin-Andrew, Ethel Dorothy Liberal Party of Canada

Western Arctic,
Northwest Territories

1988.11.21

First Nations

Littlechild, Wilton (Willie)

Progressive Conservative Party Wetaskiwin, Alberta

1988.11.21

First Nations

DeVillers, Paul

Liberal Party of Canada

Simcoe North, Ontario

1993.10.25

Metis

Harper, Elijah

Liberal Party of Canada

Churchill, Manitoba

1993.10.25

First Nations

O'Brien, Lawrence, D.

Liberal Party of Canada

Labrador, Newfoundland
and Labrador

1996.03.25

Metis

Karetak-Lindell, Nancy

Liberal Party of Canada

Nunavut,
Northwest Territories

1997.06.02

Inuit

Laliberte, Rick

New Democratic Party

Churchill River,
Saskatchewan

1997.06.02

Metis

Cleary, Bernard

Bloc Quebecois

Louis-Saint-Laurent, Quebec 2004.06.28

First Nations

Smith, David

Liberal Party of Canada

Pontiac, Quebec

2004.06.28

Metis

Russell, Todd Norman

Liberal Party of Canada

Labrador, Newfoundland
and Labrador

2005.05.24

Metis

Bruinooge, Rod

Conservative Party of Canada Winnipeg South, Manitoba
(2003)

2006.01.23

Metis

Keeper, Tina

Liberal Party of Canada

Churchill, Manitoba

2006.01.23

First Nations

Merasty, Gary

Liberal Party of Canada

Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill 2006.01.23
River, Saskatchewan

First Nations

Clarke, Rob

Conservative Party of Canada Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill 2008.03.17
(2003)
River, Saskatchewan

First Nations
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outlined above. This study has highlighted that
among the Kainai an additional four barriers
to voter participation exist in addition to the
six discussed. First, a sense of historical injustice tied to previously being barred from voting
can indeed serve to motivate participation in
Canadian elections in contradiction to the
hypothesis suggesting that past mistreatment,
specifically being banned from voting, is an
explanation for nonparticipation. Second, the
lack of mainstream Canadian society's attention to First Nations does not invariably lead
to First Nations nationalism discourses, as the
literature suggests. Rather, a desire to participate in Canadian elections was evident, specifically among participants seeking to situate
a candidate amendable to protecting historic
and individually acknowledged Aboriginal and
treaty rights.
Third, there is clearly a desire for First
Nations representation in mainstream Canadian institutions; however, from a Kainai
perspective this representation can be ensured
by visits from politicians and other candidates.
Such visits would preserve the personal aspect
of political interface that was historically an
important aspect of local politics, and remains
so. When political candidates fail to engage
Kainai residents, the Kainai turn to media coverage of politics and elections as an educational
substitute. This, however, undermines the
desired face-to-face contact due to an increasing political reliance on the media's ability to
"get the word out," as it were. Finally, the study
demonstrated the majority of residents foresee
voting in Canadian elections as a means of
improving local socioeconomic conditions.
Nonvoting in this instance was not, as the
literature has suggested, directly attributable
to the limited number of voters, the perceived
inability to make a difference, or geographic
dispersion.
The interview data suggest mixed results
when measuring the six barriers to voting that
have been presented to date as the common
reasons resulting in First Nations voter alienation. Data collected countered the hypotheses
suggesting that First Nations people fail to vote
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due to the lingering memory of the franchise
being utilized as an assimilation mechanism.
The nature of the vote and its ability to alter
the political landscape leading to refined and
improved Aboriginal policy orientations was
not considered to be abstract. Poor socioeconomic conditions on the reserve did not act
as a deterrent to voting, even at the Blood
Reserve, where more than 30 percent of the
citizenry is currently on social assistance of
one kind or another. Participants did express a
fear of voting, however. In order to exercise the
franchise, one had to leave the community to
vote in what were presented as hostile environments (Le., nonreserve communities), suggesting that placing a polling booth at Standoff,
the reserve's largest commercial center, would
enable people vote in comfortable surroundings.
Several of the six hypotheses were supported in this study. Communication remains
an issue, especially when it comes time to
determine when and where to vote. The
proliferation of televisions and especially the
Internet and the availability of home computers and community access sites now enable
individuals to conduct quick research and stay
abreast of current events. Discerning accurate
information from partisan sources remains a
concern. Community needs were unanimously
presented as more important than regional,
provincial, and federal politics. Yet the majority of participants indicated that voting in
Canadian elections influences policy creation;
therefore, it influences reserve conditions. The
nationalism discourse in this case emerges not
as an aggressive assertion of sovereignty and/
or Aboriginal rights so much as a thinly veiled
distrust of the Canadian political system and
its potential to harm First Nations people.
Although this study has shed light on
individual Kainai voting behavior, little has
changed in ten years since Barsh's study of
southern Alberta First Nations voting participation. Many of the same barriers to voting
remain in place. In that time, additional obstacles have emerged or are being formally articulated. Interestingly, the vote is not viewed with
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suspicion so much as its relevance to improving
local socioeconomic conditions is questioned.
The lack of attention currently being paid to
this phenomenon and its potential correctives
is troublesome but no more so than the admittedly limited analyses of First Nations voting
participation, which can be characterized as
a reductive practice situating First Nations
people in one of two groups: (1) First Nations
nationalists with isolationist tendencies, or (2)
disloyal ex-patriots who are characterized in
a variety of ways ranging from the colloquial
(apples) to the academic (compradors).86
Failure to suggest that First Nations people
in reserve communities may consider themselves Liberals, Conservatives, or Green Party
members willing to discuss their interest in federal and provincial politics while still remaining involved in, or at the very least informed
about, First Nations reserve politics hampers
our understanding of the First Nations voting
experience. A middle ground of choice cannot
exist if the literature accurately reflects the
dynamics being experienced in First Nations
communities nationally. Kainai voter participation, specifically, and First Nations voting
behavior, in general, are nuanced phenomena
in need of improved academic attention.
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